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1. Q. Has there been any major change in the training program for the Soviet armed forces since 1946?
 - A. No. Training is basically that of World War II, modified by the experiences of World War II. As an example, during World War II tanks were often employed alone without the immediate support of infantry, and of course many tanks were lost. In the postwar era, the basic doctrine is that tanks must always be accompanied by infantry and that infantry must always be supported by tanks. Therefore, the major stress in training is placed on the employment of tank-infantry teams and cooperation between the branches of service.
2. Q. Are the regulations for the employment of tank and mechanized forces, published in two volumes between 1945 and 1946, still in effect?
 - A. Yes, they are still the "Bible" for training and employment of tank and mechanized forces. However, from time to time the Service Academies, in cooperation with the General Staff, publish periodic information bulletins for the information of officers. This publication is classified "secret" and therefore does not get widespread dissemination to the troops, but is used as a basis for changes in training programs.
3. Q. Does the Soviet Army recognize histories of World War II as a source of determining practical and strategic errors? Do they take cognizance of such errors, and what action is taken to avoid making any such errors in future wars?
 - A. Yes. The General Staff Sections are very much aware of the value of World War II histories in determining what errors were made in the field, and the Frunze Academy is making detailed studies of World War II tactics. Naturally, many of these studies are used to confirm the validity of tactics in particular situations. Where there are studies of glaring tactical or strategic errors, training directives are published in the periodic information bulletins to bring them to the attention of all officers. For example: certain tactical errors which the German General Staff found to be rather common in Soviet units of division size and lower, were pointed out as an example of errors which might benefit considerably in future warfare: specifically, the poorly coordinated make-up of march

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-2-

25X1

serials within a division size unit on the approach march, which in many cases the Germans took advantage of in gaining initial advantage during a meeting engagement. This of course is not Soviet field manual doctrine but was a result of poor road nets and impassable terrain. Positive action is being taken to improve continuity and compactness of march serials.

4. Q. Is there any new doctrine adopted generally in the Soviet army which gives more latitude of freedom to subordinate commanders than they had in World War II?
- A. Yes. Subordinate commanders are urged to exploit to the fullest any local success, whereas previously, exploiting or pursuing units were given certain objectives to reach at which they were supposed to halt. Now tactical doctrine prescribes no such limits. I should like, as an example, to point out a peculiarity noted by the German officers during World War II, that is, a lack of deep penetration on the part of units subordinate to the division. So consistent was this peculiarity that the Germans could expect the Soviet tank forces of battalions and regiments to stop some four to five kilometers behind the lines after achieving a penetration. This peculiarity did exist as it was commonly called for in operation orders but nowadays there is no such limit placed on exploiting units.

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